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phenomenon to show social risk. The data which I analyze is the Comprehensive Survey of 
People’s Living Condition in 1986, 1995, and 2004, conducted by the Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare of Japan.  
There are two major findings of this paper.  First, I found that the overall economic 
inequality among the elderly aged 65 and over has declined mainly because of the decline 
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household types. In particular, the high advantage in the economic well-being of the elderly 
in a three-generation household has been no longer guaranteed. Second, there was a 
significant gender difference in the relationship between his/her past life course and 
economic hardship in their later life. In sum, the location of the elderly at home and in the 
labor market has changed, and as a consequence, the content of social risk related to aging 
has been more differentiated. 
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to discuss social risk focusing on the aging 
population in Japan, and in conclusion, I propose a future direction for 
making our society more sustainable. A country’s demography is formed by 
the life courses of individuals, and it shapes the society. Japan is undergoing a 
demographic transformation characterized by an aging population. This 
transformation has three components: the birth rate, mortality, and 
immigration. Fertility, the main determinant of a society’s demographic 
structure, has declined in Japan for the last three to four decades, and in 2012 
stood at 1.41, far below the replacement rate of 2.07. Since the mid-1980s, as 
a result of increased longevity, the proportion of the elderly, those aged 65 
years and above, has increased dramatically and was 24.1 percent in 2012.1
Such a demographic transformation has increased the generation gap 
between working and retired people, and because of the rapidity of the 
change in Japan, the social welfare system cannot keep pace with the current 
situation. For example, the pension system in Japan became problematic 
mainly because of the unbalance in size between the working-age generation 
who contribute to the social security system and the retired generation who 
receive benefits. In addition to the generational unbalance, the situation of 
the labor market, particularly for young people, has worsened since the late 
2000s. As a result, young people whose financial basis for life can no longer 
be guaranteed are delaying marriage or choosing not to marry. On the other 
hand, the elderly have drastically altered their living arrangements in which 
the number of one-person and couple-only households increased in contrast 
with the decline in three-generation households. The welfare system, the 
framework for intergenerational gap conflict between the beneficiary and 
benefactor, relies heavily on roles in the family where a clear division of labor 
is supposed to exist. The assumptions underlying the social welfare system in 
Japan are less valid today and people are falling through the large cracks. One 
example is the increase in poverty, particularly among families with young 
children (Shirahase 2009). No other western countries have experienced such 
a swift change in demographic and family structure in such a short period of 
time. There are no clear solutions for the resultant social problems. I will 
discuss Japan’s social risk focusing on the sociodemographic perspective such 
1 Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (http://www.stat.go.jp/
data/topics/topi631.htm, accessed on July 28, 2013) 
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as the change in the family structure and economic inequality. 
Differentiation among the Elderly
The challenge for a policy response to the intergenerational imbalance 
resulting from the decreasing birthrate and aging population is fast 
approaching. By imbalance, here, it is meant specifically that as the number 
of retired older people (the elderly) supported by each member of the 
working generation (productive-age population) rises, the burden on the 
working generation grows as well. According to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications’ Population Census, in 1980 the number of 
members of the working generation (15 to 64 years of age) supporting one 
person of 65 or over was 11.2, whereas in 1990 the figure was down to about 
half as much, or 5.8 individuals. By 2000 it had dropped to 3.9, a decrease of 
almost twenty-five percent in twenty years. According to the National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research (with assumptions of 
medium-variant fertility rate and mortality rate), a decrease in the ratio of 
working people to the elderly population that they support can be projected 
from 2.8 in 2010 to 1.3 in 2060.2
In considering the phenomenon of the aging population, one must grasp 
both the macro and the micro dimensions. On a macro scale, the size 
imbalance between the economy-sustaining working generation and the 
retired elderly class presents a model of population structure. To focus 
attention on an individual’s way of life and life course, whether he or she is 
unmarried and lives alone or lives with a spouse, is to encourage a micro-
level discussion closely entwined with issues of disparity within the elderly 
class. Taking the social security system as an example, it is possible to 
consider any correlation with the pension system from a macro perspective, 
and on the micro side, long-term care insurance. For the pension system, a 
structure within which the working generation pays out insurance premiums 
to provide the retired generation a source of benefit funding; as a result, an 
imbalance develops in the scale between the workforce and the retired elderly 
strata. A system of long-term care insurance was introduced in response to 
the question of who should bear the burden of providing assistance and 
nursing care as people live longer, and with this a discrepancy grows between 
so-called biological and societal age (Moen et al. 1992; House et al. 1994). In 
2 http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/newest04/gh2401.pdf, accessed July 28, 2013.
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other words, with the rise in individual life expectancy, this system was 
designed to better distribute the risks associated with health and nursing care 
across society.
The often noted intergenerational imbalance is, then, relevant to what is 
referred to here as a macro perspective. And yet it is more than a difference in 
scale between the age groups: the different restrictions of the social systems 
and the era experienced by each age generation are reflected in the 
interrelationships between them. The difference, for example, between those 
who were successful in their job hunting and became working members of 
society within the era of rapid economic growth and those looking for 
employment in the unanticipated economic slump of the Heisei era are large 
and persistent throughout their life courses. The life patterns following the 
job hunting stage are reflected in each generation’s work lives as well as in 
family formation such as marriage and childrearing. This is referred to in 
sociology as the cohort effect, and it points to the idea of a group born to a 
specific era undergoing a shared experience and presenting a particular trait. 
Between those assured of employment within a lifespan in which guaranteed 
lifetime employment was the norm and those for whom working life 
commenced with a seemingly endless stream of short-term contracts for 
non-regular employment, the generation gap is considerable. From the 
perspective of age 65 being the beginning of the second half of a life, 
regardless of the era one was born in there is this commonality on the one 
hand. However, the era in which one lived up until that point will differ for 
an older person born in the 1930s and an older person born in the 1940s. For 
those to become 65 or older in the future, the substance of that elderly status 
will undoubtedly differ again.
In considering the life path of an individual taking old age as the 
compilation of a life lived, this stage becomes one in which the qualitative 
differences, advantages and disadvantages of the working life stage are stored 
(Merton 1968; Crystal and Shea 1990; Shuey and Willson 2008). In this old 
age, not only the individual’s way of life but also his or her connections with 
family and the social system must be taken into account. Many who spent 
their working years in poverty will tend to become more and more penniless 
as they enter old age, whereas those who have lived affluent lives are able to 
establish themselves in a retirement of leisure and comfort, making good use 
of the assets and human resources laid in store until then. The lifestyle of the 
elderly is influenced not only by earnings but also by what standard of 
assistance or support has been retained, such as monetary and societal 
reserves. That is, the quality of one’s life in old age, the final stage of human 
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life, is determined by economic and  societal assets, in an era in which 
inequalities may be even more strikingly observed.
In an international comparison of income inequality among the older 
generations, the mid-1980s saw the extent of the income gap for Japan’s 
elderly head of household stratum standing out (Shirahase 2002). A major 
reason for this was that the economic welfare level or economic well- being 
represented by earnings differs greatly depending upon with whom the 
elderly were living . During that era, a large number of elderly Japanese were 
part of three-generation households that included the families of their 
children. In such households, the employed adult children supported the 
family finances, so that by living together the elderly could benefit from some 
security of income. However, it is not the case that all elderly people live with 
their children in contemporary Japan (Shirahase 2009). Older people 
(particularly women) tend to live alone. And in as much as they are not 
cohabiting with family, they may find themselves pressed into a lifestyle with 
serious poverty risk. A family will make provisions for an elderly member’s 
standard of living: until now, the existence or absence of cohabiting family 
has been a determining factor for the lifestyle (including family formation) of 
elderly people.
Compared to the mid-1980s, income inequality for the elderly age group 
has decreased due to the expansion of the social security system, with the 
pension system as a prime example. With this, with whom one lives has come 
to have less sway in the economic welfare standard of the elderly than was 
previously the case. Still, the disparity in income of the elderly in comparison 
with other age groups is large, and it is particularly the case that the poverty 
rate of elderly women living alone remains high. Factors such as what sort of 
work one was engaged in, what sort of family structure was formed in one’s 
younger years, what order of resources was laid in store, and what standard of 
human relationships (family relationships) had been established going into 
one’s later years have a great influence over the quality of life of the elderly 
person. In this paper, I would like to discuss the degree of income inequality 
among the Japanese elderly from the following two aspects, that is, work and 
family.  
The Working Elderly
Compared to the U.S. and Europe, one major reason for the economic 
inequality of Japan’s elderly class is that the employment rate for elderly 
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people is relatively high (Shirahase 2002, 2009). Workers in the U.S. and 
Europe retire at a designated age to enjoy a life of leisure. In the 1980s, the 
Mitterrand administration in France lowered the starting retirement age for 
provision of pensions to 60, defining “the golden years” as a time to enjoy the 
latter half of human life in which one was liberated from paid employment. 
However, lowering the starting age for pension allowance exerts an inevitable 
pressure upon the social security budget. Not only France but other European 
nations, because of  financial pressures related to the aging of their 
populations, have been forced to reverse their policies and keep the elderly 
within the labor market longer (Duval 2003). The challenge becomes how 
best to present the continuance of work in a positive light and how to erase 
the negative connotations of prolonged employment. In this challenge to cast 
off a societal tendency to prefer early retirement, Japan, with its high rate of 
elderly workers, can provide a model for Europe. In fact, when surveyed 
about their desired retirement age, about 40 percent of Japanese respondents 
over 60 replied, “I will work for as long as I am able.” Such figures reflect a 
strong desire to work among the elderly (Cabinet Office 2011).
Japan’s labor force participation rate for the elderly aged 65 and over is 
higher than that of most west European countries in OECD countries.3 That 
is, in contrast to the European case of the majority retiring to take up their 
pensions upon reaching the mandatory age for retirement, and their income 
levels resulting from revenue from those pensions, in Japan, Taiwan, Korea 
and such countries where the rates of working elderly are relatively high, the 
livelihoods of the elderly are sustained in accordance with the income of the 
work in which they are engaged. In fact, the living standards of the elderly in 
these countries differ substantially according to whether they are working or 
not.
As continued employment in older age may prove sufficient to maintain 
economic standards of living, the motivation for continued employment of 
the elderly becomes powerful. Accordingly, while the significance of work to 
the individual’s life may be among the reasons for the high proportion of 
employed older people in Japan, this must be due to the benefits of the 
income obtained through working. Further, the difficulty of subsisting on 
pension alone must also be raised as a factor.
According to a national survey on the economic life of the elderly 
implemented by the Cabinet Office in 2011, the most common reason for 
3 The labor force participation rate of the elderly aged 65 and over in Japan is 20 percent, and its 
OECD average is 12.8 percent in 2012 (http://stats.oecd.org, accessed on August 4, 2013).
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working given by the elderly, accounting for a majority of respondents, was 
“to cover living costs.” This dimension of working in order to live is also very 
present. When figures for the employed and the unemployed elderly are 
mixed, it results in changes to structures of revenue. Income is mainly 
divided into earned income received from one’s own employment and 
income from non-employment sources such as pension or bank interest and 
dividends. That the income structure for old age does not differentiate 
between those working for a wage and the unemployed is related to a major 
change in the proportion of earned income to unearned income.
In old age, the number of the unemployed increases, and these 
individuals make their living through unearned income such as pensions 
rather than through work-related income. Just as in the disparity within 
work-related income, this disparity between work-related income and 
unearned income, roughly speaking, between wage and pension income, is 
reflected in the statistics. As pensions tend to be low compared to wages, 
retirement is another means by which the elderly are pressed into low social 
class standing; thus, the disparity widens. However, in Europe, where cases of 
retirement at age 60 and earlier are common and the income structure for the 
elderly is mostly comprised of unearned income, and the economic disparity 
of the elderly as a class can be explained by pension and such unearned 
income streams, the disparity is expected to be less than that involving work-
related income. In fact, the income disparity in later life in Europe is said to 
have relatively declined in comparison to other stages of life (Pampel 1981; 
Hurd and Shoven 1985).
In Japan, where many continue as self-employed workers after joining 
the elderly class, characteristically economic inequality among the elderly is 
higher than for other age groups (Shirahase 2009). However, as the number 
of self-employed elderly diminish and the number of those retiring and living 
on pensions (unearned income) increases, economic inequality within the 
elderly class is narrowing since the mid-1980s.
Income Inequality across Households with Elderly Members
What is the relationship between the change in household structure and 
economic inequality among the elderly? This section examines income 
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poverty rate.5 In this paper, I use data from the Comprehensive Survey of 
Living Conditions in Japan (CSLCJ). The CSLCJ is a nationally-representative 
survey of households conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare since the mid-1980s. In order to see the overall trend, I use three 
points of CSLCJ survey years, that is, 1986, 1995, and 2004. 
In the mid-1980s the overall poverty rate across all households was 11.5 
percent. By the mid-1990s it had grown to 13.2 percent, and by the mid-
2000s it was at 17.1 percent. The increase in the poverty rate since 2000 was 
particularly large. The poverty rate for households with elderly members 
increased to be 20 percent higher than the poverty rate for the total number 
of households. Figure 1 presents the poverty rates by the type of household in 
which elderly members reside over the three points of the survey in order to 
examine how the poverty rates differ by the types of households with elderly 
members.
The poverty rate across all types of households with elderly members is 
n = sample size, yi = disposable income of the household i, and µ = the mean disposable income of 
the total of households.
5 The poverty rate is calculated as the proportion of households whose disposable income is less 
than the median disposable income of total households in the society.
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Figure 1 Trends in the poverty rate by type of household with elderly members
1986 1995 2004
 Fig. 1.—Trends in the poverty rate by type of household with elderly members. 
Source: Comprehensive Survey of People’s Living Conditions (Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare).
 Demography as Social Risk 221
declining overall. The household type with the most dramatic decline in 
poverty rate is the one-person household. In the mid-1980s, about 50 percent 
of male one-person households were in poverty, whereas by the mid-2000s, 
the figure had decreased to 30 percent. The poverty rate among female one-
person households was even higher, and the decline more dramatic: over 70 
percent were in poverty in the 1980s, falling to 48.5 percent by the mid-
2000s. Although there has been a clear decline, the poverty rate among 
elderly women living alone remains quite marked. With longer life spans and 
a growing tendency to remain unmarried, it is possible that the poverty rate 
of single elderly female households will remain high or become even higher. 
And given that the poverty rate among three-generation households with 
elderly members is lower than ten percent, it is safe to conclude that living 
alone as an elderly person entails considerable economic risk.
The overall poverty rate has increased among all households in which an 
elderly person resides. Yet the trend in the poverty rate of some household 
types with elderly members shows a decline. Although the overall poverty 
rate is increasing, why is the poverty rate of certain household types 
declining? How can these contrasting trends be explained and what do they 
mean (especially since there are indications that the overall poverty rate 
across all types of households with elderly has improved over the last twenty 
years)? However, elderly one-person households have a much higher poverty 
rate than three-generation households. What is occurring here is that the 
percentage of the total number of households with relatively high poverty 
rates has increased, so consequently the overall poverty rate among 
households with elderly members has also increased. This suggests that both 
the proportional distribution of household structure and the poverty rates by 
household type with elderly members have to be taken into account when 
examining changes in the overall poverty rate among the elderly.
In order to explain the reasons for the change in the extent of income 
inequality, I divided it into three factors: (1) the effect due to changes within 
household type; (2) the effect from changes in the distribution of the 
household structure over time; and (3) the effect from changes in the 
difference between household types. These three effects correspond to the 
following questions: (1) whether changes in the degree of income disparity 
were caused by a rise in the degree of income inequality within a particular 
type of household; (2) whether it occurred due to a change in the 
proportional distribution of the overall household structure; or (3) whether it 
depended on changes in the mean difference between the household types 
over time. To break down changes in the degree of income inequality into 
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these three factors, I have adopted the study by Nishizaki, Yamada and Ando 
(1998). For example, to explain the change in MLD from 1986 to 1995, I 
break it down into three kinds of factors. The first part depicts the intra-
household effect, the second and the third denote the distributional effects of 
the household structure, and the fourth examines the inter-household effects.
19861995 MLDMLDMLD −=∆
ln lnii i i i i
i i i ii i
MLD MLD µ µα α α α
µ µ
    
 = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆   
     
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
iα : the mean proportion of the household category i in 1986 and 1995
iMLD : the mean MLD of the household category i in 1986 and 1995
iµ : the mean disposable income of the household category i in each year
µ : the mean disposable income of the total of households in each year
Table 1 shows the results of breaking down the three factors in the 
change of MLD among households with elderly members. When comparing 
1986 to 1995, the overall degree of income inequality increased from 0.239 to 
0.252, showing a difference of 0.013. The major factor in explaining this 
change is the distributional change of the households between 1986 and 1995. 
The degree of income inequality within each household type has slightly 
increased, and the distributional change in household structure represented 
by the decline in three-generation households and the rise in one-person 
households and couple-only households largely explains the increase in the 
degree of income inequality between these two periods. On the other hand, 
the between-household difference has declined. The difference in the mean 
disposable income by household type became smaller in these years.
In a cross-national analysis, Shirahase (2002) claims that a characteristic 
TABLE 1




















 Source.—Comprehensive Survey of People’s Living Conditions (Ministry of Health, Labor, 
and Welfare).
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of income inequality in households with elderly members in Japan is that the 
level of economic well-being of the elderly differs significantly depending on 
the type of household in which they live. For instance, the economic well-
being of the elderly who live alone is inferior when compared to that of those 
who live in a three-generation household. In contrast to Western Europe, the 
structures of households in which the elderly live in Japan are diverse, and it 
is one of the reasons that the extent of income inequality is much larger in 
Japan than in Europe. As the nation’s social security system, particularly the 
pension system, has improved, the poverty rates among the elderly, 
particularly elderly women living alone, has improved markedly. And 
because of improvements in the social system, the overall extent of income 
inequality by household type has declined in Japan. However, there is still 
ample space for improvement.
From 1995 to 2004, the overall extent of economic inequality improved 
from 0.252 to 0.230. One of the major reasons for this was a decline of 
income inequality within particular household types. Inter-household 
differences narrowed in the period from 1986 to 1995, though to a lesser 
extent than in the previous period. The decline in economic inequality from 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s mainly occurred due to the improvement in 
within-household inequality (−0.029), and the extent of income inequality 
within household types became smaller between 1995 and 2004. However, 
the effect of the distributional change in household structure has remained 
positive, which means that the distributional change in household structure, 
represented by the increase in one-person and couple-only households, has 
led to an increase in the overall degree of income inequality. On the other 
hand, the effect of within-household changes on the extent of income 
inequality overcame distributional changes in household structure with 
elderly members between 1995 and 2004, and consequently, the overall 
extent of income inequality has declined since the mid-1990s.
Regarding changes in the structure of households with elderly members, 
the mean size of the household has become small due to the increase in the 
number of one-person households and couple-only households. Whereas 
formerly, the majority of the elderly used to live with their child’s family in 
three-generational households (where they could enjoy basic livelihood 
security, including income security within the household), at present the 
number of one-person households and couple-only households has 
increased, so that the decrease in household size is positively related to the 
high extent of income inequality. However, the between-household difference 
in the level of economic well-being has also become small, and the gap 
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between the elderly in three-generation households and in one-person 
households is no longer so large. This is the main reason that the overall 
extent of income inequality has declined recently.
The results confirm that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the 
extent of income inequality within certain household types lessened and thus 
led to the lessening of the overall extent of income inequality among 
households with elderly members. Figure 2 depicts how the weighted extent 
of income inequality within one household type contributed to the overall 
extent of income inequality, which corresponds to the first component in the 
equation shown earlier. Figure 2 shows that a large proportion of the recent 
reduction in the extent of economic inequality across all households with 
elderly members was caused by a reduction in inequality within couple-only 
households. The negative effect derived from female one-person households 
(which traditionally have had a high poverty rate) on the overall change in 
the extent of income inequality is similarly significant, but not to the extent of 
that of elderly couple-only households. This result can be interpreted as 
follows: the contribution of a reduction in the extent of income inequality in 
one-person households is relatively smaller than that in couple-only 
households, a difference that is partly due to the fact that the proportion of 
the former is smaller than that of the latter. Couple-only households make up 
over one-third of all households, and as of 2004 this was the largest single 
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Figure 2 Within-housheold effect on changes in the degree of income inequality (MLD) by household type
1986-1995 1995-2004
 Fig. 2.—Within-housheold effect on changes in the degree of income inequality 
(MLD) by household type. Source: Comprehensive Survey of People’s Living 
Conditions (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare).
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group by type of household. The lessening of the extent of income inequality 
within this group – the couple-only households – has mostly contributed to 
the reduction in the overall degree of economic inequality among households 
with elderly members. Improvements in the public pension system are likely 
to be a major reason for this reduction.
Economic Inequality among Three-Generation Households
In the previous section, I found that the elderly members of three-
generation households are relatively better off in terms of economic well-
being, compared with those living in other types of households. In fact, the 
poverty rate of elderly living in three-generation households is the lowest, 
and consequently, the extent of income inequality is the smallest. Yet, the 
number of elderly living in three-generation households has been declining, 
even though the Japanese-style welfare system is based on this model. The 
transformation in the structure of households with elderly members means 
that these three-generation households are no longer as common as they 
used to be, and that the elderly can no longer expect to enjoy the livelihood 
security provided by family members. This section of the paper pays closer 
attention to these ‘three-generation households’, which today constitute one-
quarter of the total number of households with elderly members, focusing on 
the economic position of the elderly member within the household.
First, I would like to examine the definition of ‘household head’. As the 
person who represents the household, the household head is usually expected 
to play the role of breadwinner. As of 2004, about 90 percent of household 
heads were breadwinners. When looking at households with elderly 
members, however, the household head is not always the same person as the 
breadwinner. In fact, there are cases in which an elderly father remains the 
head of the household, whereas the actual breadwinner is a son. From 1986 
to 2004, the percentage of three-generation households that designated an 
elderly member as the head increased from 20 to 36 percent.
Figure 3 shows that the poverty rate for households in which the head is 
non-elderly declined slightly from 10 percent in 1986 to 8 percent in 2004, 
and that among households with an elderly head it increased from 8 percent 
in 1986 to 11 percent in 1995, and then dropped to 9 percent in 2004. 
Interestingly, whereas in the mid-1980s the poverty rate among elderly-
headed households was lower than among non-elderly-headed households 
(usually the son was the head), from 1995 onwards the poverty rate among 
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elderly-headed households was higher. It is likely that both types of 
households (elderly-headed and non-elderly-headed) were affected by the 
Heisei-era recession, though differently. It would be supposed that in the 
three-generation household, the working-age family member, usually the 
son, plays the role of the household head; this member additionally plays the 
role of breadwinner and takes care of his elderly parents. Indeed, figures show 
that in 1986, the percentage of three-generation households with an elderly 
head was only 20  percent. After 2004, however, the figure almost doubled to 
36 percent, so that more than one-third of three-generation families now has 
an elderly head. These changes in the proportion of households with the 
elderly as the household head suggest that the role elderly members play in 
the household economy has changed.
Given that the household head traditionally plays the role of 
breadwinner, the increase in the proportion of elderly household heads in 
three-generation households would mean that the elderly continue to play a 
major role in supporting the family economy. Before 1995, elderly members 
in three-generation households used to enjoy economic security by living 
with the married son, who had taken over the role of breadwinner. After 
1995, however, a shift in the dynamics of family roles occurred, and it was no 









Figure 3 Poverty rate among three-generational households (elderly head 
versus non-elderly head)
non-elderly head elderly head
 Fig. 3.—Poverty rate aomgh three-generational households (eaderly head versus 
non-elderly head). Source: Comprehensive Survey of People’s Living Conditions 
(Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare).
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longer the case that the position of the elderly member of a household was 
guaranteed to be beneficial, a change that calls for an in-depth examination 
of the economic role that these elderly people played after 2004.
Figure 4 presents the poverty rates among three-generation households 
by combining the age of the household head and that of the household 
breadwinner. The most predominant combination (60 percent) is that of a 
non-elderly household head who is also the breadwinner (Type 1). Seventeen 
percent of three-generation households have an elderly head who is also the 
breadwinner (Type 2). In almost 20 percent of three-generation households, 
an elderly person holds the position of household head but is not the main 
earner (Type 3). And in a minority of cases (4 percent), a non-elderly family 
member is the household head, but is economically supported by an elderly 
member (Type 4).
The highest poverty rate is found in Type 4. An example of a Type 4 
household is one in which the son takes the position of household head, 
while the family economy is supported by the elderly parent or the grandson. 
However, because of the small number of these household types, the results 
call for careful interpretation. The lowest poverty rate, on the other hand, can 
 Fig. 4.—Poverty rate aomgh three-generational households by type of household 
head (eaderly/non-elderly, breadwinner/non-breadwinner) in 2004. Source: 
Comprehensive Survey of People’s Living Conditions (Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare).
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be seen in Type 1 households, in which a non-elderly member takes the 
position of household head, earns the most, and supports the household 
economy. Therefore, it can be supposed that the elderly member in a 
conventional three-generation household would gain economic security by 
sharing the household with the younger generation. However, while the 
majority of three-generation households are of this type, the proportion is 
decreasing, and it can be speculated that the so-called Japanese-type welfare 
state, in which the young generation provides the elderly members of the 
household with basic livelihood security, is fading.
Trajectory of One’s Life Course to the Elderly Stage
In what ways is the life of an individual up to the elderly stage reflected 
in the economic conditions of that stage? Here, by focusing our attention on 
the marital status (whether unmarried, divorced or widowed) of the elderly 
person living alone, we will make a conjecture as to the life course and 
consider its relationship to poverty risk in old age.
In the mid-2000s, the majority of elderly people living alone are assumed 
to have been living in bereavement for deceased partners, with 80 percent of 
women being widows and 70 percent of men being widowers. However, the 
TABLE 2
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economic risk of living alone in old age differs according to whether one was 
always single, widowed or divorced. Table 2 illustrates the poverty rates of 
elderly people with relation to their marital status. From the table we can see 
that for elderly single men, the rate of poverty is higher than for divorced or 
widowed elderly men, a difference so great as to be statistically significant. 
Whether these men never married due to a lack of funds or became poor in 
older age because they had not married, the true direction of this causal 
relationship cannot be determined by means of this data. However, in any 
event, for unmarried men entering into old age, there is a high risk of 
poverty; there is a close correlation.
On the other hand, women’s poverty rate is not greatly affected by 
whether they are single, widowed or divorced. The poverty rate of elderly 
women living alone has declined. While the rate of poverty among elderly 
women living alone reached as high as 70 percent in the mid-1980s, by the 
mid-2000s it was below 50 percent. While the poverty rate remains high, 
even in widowhood this high poverty rate does not suggest for elderly 
women as clear a distinction according to life course as that of the men.
What kind of significance might such a difference between the numbers 
for men and for women suggest? One interpretation is as follows. As 
represented by the high poverty rate of elderly men who are unmarried, in 
the case of men, the reason for remaining unmarried and living alone is 
related closely to the individual’s economic stability. For men without such 
stability, the likelihood of remaining unmarried throughout one’s lifetime 
may be expected to be high, while on the other hand, economic strength and 
marital status are not closely connected to a similar extent for women. 
Whereas a man’s own lifestyle choices may relate directly to his own 
economic stability, for a woman, whatever her life choices may have been in 
the past, her condition of living by herself does not reflect directly upon her 
economic standard of living. That is to say, in comparison to men, women are 
not actualizing an accumulation of lived experience in the form of economic 
stability. The individual woman’s economic standing is linked not so much to 
her own life course as it is prescribed by her connection to her relatives, her 
parents or husband. That a difference in the economic conditions of elderly 
women is not directly reflected to any great degree by a life course that 
involves her living alone does not suggest that women’s lives have not been 
constricted in the past. Upon looking into why an elderly person came to live 
alone, we may rather reflect that the life course up to that point was one in 
which rank was established not so much within the individual as within the 
relationships inside the family, suggesting that up to now the relationship 
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between the life course and the individual’s economic stability has been an 
indirect one.
Most women have lived with their parents until they get married, so that 
should this unmarried interval be prolonged, the time spent under her 
parents’ roof would as well. Rather than what sort of life course one has 
followed up to this point, whether she has lived with anyone or by herself 
seems to regulate to a high degree the woman’s economic level. The woman 
as an individual will not have accumulated from her lifestyle to the extent 
that a man has; in living with or apart from her surrounding family and 
relatives, her economic level has been determined in indirect and direct ways. 
On the other hand, whether a man chooses to go through life unmarried or 
not reflects very directly upon his risk of poverty in old age.
In this sense, in observing differences in life patterns and differences in 
poverty rates, it might be said that when men depart from the stereotypical 
path, they bear a heavy penalty. While within gender theory, traditionally the 
position of women as the oppressed sex has been emphasized, in fact the 
penalty for departing from convention is shown here to be higher for men. 
Life as a single among the elderly, in Japan as in the West, is a position of 
economic disadvantage. However, it cannot be overlooked that the paths 
taken there and the effects of the life choices made along the way differ 
according to gender, and that particularly for men who deviate from the 
mainstream comes substantial economic sanction.
Who has come and via what life path to the latter years of life? Such 
interior details can never be fully grasped, but through the frame of poverty 
we can make conjectures as to one consequence of life choices. Nevertheless, 
it is not only in the makeup of past lives that we can find real evidence of 
disparity not readily apparent. One other such factor is the regional 
differences of the aging population.
Conclusion: The Risk Sharing and Sustainability of the Society
The aging process is accompanied by various social risks such as being 
ill, losing one’s job and economic security, being bereaved, and facing 
loneliness, at the individual basis.  And at the macro level, we have witnessed 
that the demographic structure of our society has largely changed in a short 
period of time mainly due to a sharp drop in the fertility rate during the 
1950s. At the same time, the family structure in which the elderly live also 
largely changed. The elderly used to deal with the risks related to their aging 
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process by co-residing with family members of younger generations, mostly 
their eldest son. Such a multi-generational household made it possible for the 
elderly to share various risks related to the aging process across various 
generations within the household. However, now, the majority of the elderly 
live either by themselves or just with their spouse, and such a conventional 
way of risk sharing at the household level has become more and more 
difficult.  
In different life stages the risks and needs for people differ. For example, 
looking at health, with age it becomes easier to catch a cold, physical strength 
lessens, and the hips and legs deteriorate (with differences between 
individuals, naturally). Even by increasing one’s longevity and alleviating 
health problems somewhat by engaging in moderate exercise, cutting down 
on excess eating and drinking and watching eating habits, nonetheless, the 
rise in health risks with aging cannot be altogether curtailed. But to suggest 
for this reason that one focus solely on ingesting high-risk items, to arrange 
for compensation payments with regard to such risks, and so on would be 
preposterous. Within a society of an aging population and declining 
birthrate, what is surely most essential now is social cohesion, or to put it 
another way, a societal structure with a mutual support system of shared 
various risks.
The mutual support suggested here is not within a relationship of shared 
risk and benefit in the immediate sense but a mutual gain over individual life 
courses, surpassing any instantaneous cost or benefit to form together a 
collective movement toward an abundant society. It is for this reason that in 
forming our shared society it is asked of us that we employ strength of 
imagination not limited to the standard of only what we can see. Even an 
individual who is currently healthy and to whom sickness is an irrelevancy 
cannot assert that the possibility of future illness or injury is nil. In this sense, 
the life of a person consists in part of an accumulation of various chances and 
risks. Therefore, for everyone to work together to take apart the various risks 
will bring more blessings than anyone can even predict. More than anything, 
for people of different ages who have lived among so many generations, 
creating a shared society and engaging in such cooperation will culminate in 
a lasting cycle of many benefits.
And so the income inequality from the 1980s has been explained and the 
significance of the aging population has been expressed. The income 
inequality of the elderly class is great, and it is composed of a mixture of both 
the rich and the poor. As the size of the current working generation reduces 
in connection with declining birth rates, the number of elderly people to be 
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supported by each member of that current working generation increases. An 
issue that arises here, however, is that while the economic conditions of the 
current working generation lending support weaken, the economic 
conditions of the elderly groups, of the people to be supported, vary widely. 
That is, it has been proven difficult to grasp an aging society which holds to 
such a simplistic intergenerational relationship such as one that supports a 
structure in which the working generation supports the retired elderly class. 
Of the working generation and the elderly, it has become impossible to state 
that the former is more economically stable than the latter, and in some cases 
the reverse may be true. In which event, the role of the working generation as 
supporters of the elderly in itself becomes problematic and a state of affairs 
has been reached in which the system itself can no longer be effectively 
administered.
One possibility, then, is to construct a redistribution measure based not 
only on multiple generations but within the generations themselves. This 
exposition of the benefits and provisions of a society of mutual support 
centers its focus on its benefits and provisions, but an accumulation is needed 
to hold up these benefits and provisions and for this the responsibility must 
be levied. This discussion, from the point of income inequality, has centered 
on the flow, but the inequalities in the elderly stage also result from an 
accumulation of inequality up to then, and the disparity in assets like land 
and savings is substantial. We have come to a stage in which it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which not only the ‘flow’ but the ‘stock’ must be subject 
to being redistributed and returned to society.
The rate of asset holding of the elderly is high compared on average to 
other age groups. Yet in speaking here of averages we must not forget the 
large gap that exists between the haves and the have-nots. Because of this, it is 
inadequate to treat the ranking of the elderly within the social system 
according to age alone. In terms of mutual assistance, this assumes a structure 
in which the young and middle-aged as well as the elderly all contribute to 
the system. In particular, as this paper has shown with regard to the income 
inequality among the elderly, the questions of to whom, where and in what 
manner accumulated resources are transferred become integral to political 
measures of redistribution. When we aim for a sustainable society, attention 
is given to a future facing endurance, but in considering redistribution 
measures it might perhaps be helpful to consider introducing a system for 
clearing the “accumulation” in the course of an individual’s lifetime instead of 
passing it down to the next generation.
Looking from the perspective of maintaining social security funding, the 
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introduction of a new consumption tax is under consideration. Certainly, in 
terms of widening the scope of funds without restrictions on use, raising the 
consumption tax is bound to be effective. However, prior to that, or 
simultaneously, a review of direct taxes such as those on inheritance, property 
or income is urgently needed. Sweden’s generous social welfare policy is built 
from collections taken from the middle class up throughout the highest tax 
rates, which is a wide scope. In Japan’s case, on the other hand, the tax rate of 
the middle class income bracket is flat and the income tax revenue made up 
from annual income is restricted (OECD 2012). Upon consideration of the 
social welfare measures for the elderly, taking into account that social group’s 
particular needs and the redistribution policy, and taking into account the 
disparity within society as a whole, the former determines the target group 
for the system by age and the latter determines responsibility not by age but 
by standards of earnings and assets. From this it is not too much to say that 
the benefit created from that responsibility would be guaranteed to be 
available regardless of age.
Whether we are talking about those aged 65 or 80, the various social 
systems whose rankings are regulated according to age alone will prove 
unable to adapt to the aging society to come. A society in which elderly 
people’s lives are various, coexisting in various generations, and continuing to 
overcome obstacles in keeping with all the society members’   real 
contributions must be a goal; it must be one image of an aging society. This 
may well be an advocacy of what has been referred to as “participatory 
society” (Atkinson 1995; Beck 2000; Miyamoto 2009). To grasp wider 
participation in the concept of responsibility, and for each member of society 
to pursue service to that society, is to visualize an invigorated and sustainable 
society without regard for the distinction of age per se.
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